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Abstract
Closed circuit television video (CCTV) surveillance systems need to be introduced or enhanced
in the public areas within United States’ mass transit systems. London’s extensive system was
used very successfully in the investigation of the July 2005 terrorist attacks on its subway and
bus systems. That effective investigatory use of CCTV is very likely to be a significant
deterrence to future terrorist activities on London mass transit. The United States must be
prepared in the event of similar attacks on its soil. As roughly twenty times more people travel
by mass transit than by air, it is time for this nation’s transportation security focus to shift to
mass transit, and to use CCTV widely in public mass transit systems.
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The Need for Closed Circuit Television in Mass Transit Systems
In the wake of 9/11, not surprisingly, transportation security has focused on air
transportation. It is imperative, however, that we now redirect our attention not only to the
recent London bombings of its underground and bus systems, but also to the transportation
bombings of Madrid in March 2004; Moscow in February and August 2004; Paris in July and
August 1995; and the Sarin gas attack in Tokyo’s subway in March 1995. We can no longer turn
a blind eye to the possibility of a devastating terrorist attack on our mass transit systems.
Improved security on these systems must be on an equal footing with concerns about aviation.
Closed circuit television (CCTV) video surveillance is a vital tool to combat terrorism in
our mass transit systems. Cameras can be placed anywhere within the public areas of these
systems, conspicuously or covertly. Basic, modern cameras have the ability to zoom, pivot, and
rotate, and focus on objects and people up to 300 feet away (“Ready,” 2005). Their video output
may be passively monitored and recorded for review at a later time, or actively monitored in real
time (Reis, 2001). Although there is some debate over privacy issues surrounding CCTV, these
arguments have little merit if CCTV is used in public and open places within mass transit
systems where passengers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy (Iraola, 2003).
Buses, subways, and trains carry about 32 million people a workday in the United States
(Lipton, 2005). Clearly, systems this diverse could not function using the passenger and baggage
security systems now used in our airports. Indeed, in 2004, when Amtrak attempted to screen
passengers at a suburban Maryland rail station, the experiment was abandoned because of the
complaints of many passengers who missed their trains or had their trains delayed (Thomas &
McGuire, 2005). CCTV is exactly the kind of security measure that can be implemented in our
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mass transit systems without compromising the efficient function of these high throughput
operations.
London has the most extensive surveillance system in the world. With about 500,000
closed circuit cameras in the city, including 6,000 in the London underground, the average
Londoner is caught on camera about 300 times a day (Rodriguez, 2005; “Ready,” 2005). Since
the July terrorist attacks, London plans to double the number of cameras in the underground, and
install cameras on all 8,000 city buses (“Ready,” 2005). This increase in CCTV was driven by
the fact that CCTV surveillance was essential in identifying the July 7 and 21 London bombers
(Segell, 2005).
Immediately after the first bombings on July 7, the United Kingdom’s secret services –
the MI5, and the Metropolitan Police at Scotland Yard – began scouring the city’s surveillance
videos for clues as to the identities of the attackers. Working with prior intelligence, pictures of
the assailants were found within 4 days of the attacks. CCTV cameras caught the four men about
to board the 7:40AM train to King’s Cross, and again at 8:26AM as the train pulled into King’s
Cross (Leppard & Calvert, 2005). Based on those pictures, the bombers’ identities and
backgrounds were discovered. When bombings were attempted 2 weeks later – this time the
terrorists were unable to detonate their bombs – CCTV footage of the terrorists was located
within a day, chronicling their actions throughout that day. With the aid of these images, four
suspects were arrested within a week (Macintyre, 2005; Rodriguez, 2005).
The United States needs to use the London CCTV model. Although CCTV is common
on U.S. university campuses, in ATM vestibules, and on highways, for example, it is not used
extensively in U.S. mass transit systems (Chace, 2001). Those U.S. cities using CCTV
surveillance report decreased crime in surveyed areas (Chapman, 2005; DiPasquale & Kleinberg,
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2005). Doubtless, terrorists would also be deterred by cameras in our mass transit systems.
Leaving deterrence aside, experience shows CCTV makes identification of terrorists and
criminals possible, which, in and of itself, can deter future attacks.
U.S. cities are beginning to recognize the importance of CCTV presence on public mass
transit systems. Shortly after the London attacks, in August 2005, the Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) voted to spend almost $7 million to equip each of
the county’s 225 subway and light-rail trains with high-resolution digital cameras whose images
can be recorded and stored (Liu, 2005). Similarly, New York City also announced in August
that its MTA had agreed to a $212 million contract to update the security technology in the city’s
subways. The planned updates to the New York subway system include the addition of 1,000
video cameras, and 3,000 motion sensors, in addition to enabling cell phone service in 277
underground stations. There are currently no plans, however, for similar advances on regular
passenger trains or buses in New York (Chan, 2005). Washington, D.C. metro officials plan to
equip 125 of their 1,300 cameraless buses with CCTV (only 100 buses are currently equipped)
(WMATA, 2005). Yet, requests from the D.C. Metro Board for money for D.C. subway security
improvements over the next 6 years have fallen short by $143 million (Greenfield, 2005).
Boston and Chicago are discussing plans to increase their surveillance systems (Chapman, 2005;
Luczak, 2004).
Many other U.S. cities use CCTV, but not for their mass transit systems. Baltimore, MD,
for example, has a network of 178 cameras dispersed in high crime areas throughout the city, but
none that monitor the city’s mass transit (Janis, 2005).
Much of the funding needed for these initiatives has been provided by the federal
government, but substantially more funding is needed. In an April 2004 survey, the American
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Public Transportation Association found that two of the top five transit agency priorities for
security capital needs were security cameras onboard vehicles and security cameras in stations.
In pursuance of these and other priorities, the survey estimated that U.S. transit agencies’
security related investment needs were $6 billion - $5.2 billion in capital investments and $800
million a year for personnel and expenses (APTA, 2004).
The federal government is contributing only a fraction of these sums. Recently, the
Department of Homeland Security announced that it will award $150 million in transportation
grants this year, $130 million of which is earmarked for public transit, and most of which will go
to large metropolitan areas (Luczak, 2005). The Federal Transit Administration also contributes
about $38 million a year for transit security (Lipowicz, 2005). Given the estimates for security
funding generally, these sums do not come close to meeting CCTV mass transit security needs.
This shortfall is particularly frustrating in light of the fact that in the FY 2006 budget for
homeland security spending, 65% of transportation security funds will go to aviation, while
surface transportation will receive only 1.4% (Johnstone, 2005). The discrepancy becomes even
more disparate when one considers that 32 million people ride some form of mass transit each
weekday, but only 1.7 million people fly every day (Lipton, 2005).
Finally, CCTV surveillance in mass transit systems should pose no constitutional issues
about privacy under the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure provisions. Since the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United States in 1967, it is settled legal doctrine that one has a
right to be free of government surveillance only where there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Specifically, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection” (Stewart, 1967). A passenger in the
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public areas within a mass transit system does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy: his
or her actions are “knowingly expose[d] to the public.”
Again, the recent train and subway bombings in London, Madrid, Moscow, and
elsewhere demonstrate the vulnerability of mass transit systems to terrorist attacks. The
foremost method of deterring and responding to those kinds of attacks is the use of CCTV. The
price tag is high, but worth it. As we have seen from the recent London experience, a few well
placed bombs on an urban transit system can bring a major metropolitan region to its knees for
days. CCTV surveillance systems are a necessary first step in securing our mass transit systems
against the threat of terrorism. Although many cities are making headway with initiatives in this
direction, more needs to be done. In particular, the federal government needs to turn its
attention, and its money, toward enabling the development of these programs.
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